Migration in EU Rural Areas by NATALE FABRIZIO et al.
  
EUR 29779 EN 
 
 
  
 
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science 
and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The 
scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European 
Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this 
publication. 
 
Contact information: fabrizio.natale@ec.europa.eu 
 
 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC116919 
 
EUR 29779 EN 
 
 
PDF ISBN  978-92-76-08600-0 ISSN  1831-9424 doi:10.2760/544298 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019 
 
© European Union, 2019 
 
Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. The reuse policy of European Commission documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU 
(OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). 
For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EU copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders. 
 
How to cite this report: Natale, F., Kalantaryan, S., Scipioni, M., Alessandrini, A. and Pasa, A., Migration in EU Rural 
Areas, EUR 29779 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019, ISBN 978-92-76-08600-0 (online), 
doi:10.2760/544298 (online), JRC116919. 
 
Image credit: © European Union 2019 except cover NASA/GSFC/METI/ERSDAC/JAROS, and U.S./Japan ASTER Science 
Team.  
The figure in the cover page represents an area with a high presence of green houses in Almeria, Spain. This type of 
agriculture is heavily relying on work by migrants. 
 
 
Title Migration in EU Rural Areas 
 
Abstract 
This report provides a quantitative overview of migration in rural areas for the entire EU. It includes a description of socio-demographic characteristics 
and main indicators of integration of migrants living in rural areas and employed in EU agriculture. More geographically detailed analyses for Spain 
and Italy explore patterns of concentration of migrants in specific Local Administrative Units in relation to local characteristics of agriculture. Finally, 
the report describes how the salience of and attitudes towards immigration differ when considering respondents living in cities, medium and small size 
towns, and rural areas. Overall, the report contributes to raising awareness of the poorly studied phenomenon of migration in rural areas. Migrants 
living in rural areas and working in agriculture, despite representing a relatively small group if compared to migrants in cities, have a fundamental role 
in sustaining certain types of agricultural production in constant demand of temporary work. At the same time, they tend to fare worse for most 
indicators of integration not only in respect of natives but also in respect of migrants living in cities and towns. Given these characteristics, migrants 
in rural areas would deserve special attention when designing integration policies.   
  
 
Table of Contents 
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 4 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 7 
 Migrants living in rural areas ............................................................................................. 11 
 Migrants working in agriculture ........................................................................................ 26 
 Residential patterns of migration and characteristics of agriculture at the local level in 
Spain and Italy .................................................................................................................................... 39 
 Salience and attitudes towards immigration and integration .......................................... 46 
 Integration of migrants in European rural areas: developing a policy response .............. 54 
References.......................................................................................................................................... 59 
List of figures ...................................................................................................................................... 62 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ 63 
 
 4 
 
Executive summary 
This report provides a quantitative overview of migration in rural areas for the entire EU. It 
contributes to raising awareness of the poorly studied phenomenon of migration to EU rural areas, 
which is often neglected in research and policies.  
Migrants living in rural areas and working in agriculture, despite representing a relatively small 
group if compared to migrants in cities, can have a fundamental role in sustaining certain types of 
agricultural production in constant demand of temporary work. At the same time, they tend to fare 
worse on most indicators of integration not only in respect of natives but also in respect of migrants 
living in cities and towns.  
Given these characteristics, migrants in rural areas, both EU mobile citizens and from Third 
Countries, would deserve special attention when designing integration policies. However, three 
main factors pose particular challenges in this respect: 
• first, the temporary nature and often irregular nature of the work of migrants in agriculture 
makes it more difficult to quantify needs and target intervention; 
• second, the territorial specificity would require local and regional rather than nation-wide 
intervention; 
• third, local authorities may be less equipped to respond to a rapid onset of a large number of 
immigrants with dedicated integration services. 
The first chapter of this report describes the residential and territorial aspects of migration in rural 
areas, providing an analysis of socio-demographic characteristics and living conditions of migrants 
from EU Member States and from Third Countries by degrees of urbanisation (cities, towns, and 
rural areas). The second chapter focuses on the labour market and compares migrants employed in 
agriculture with migrants employed in other sectors and with natives. The third chapter includes 
more geographically detailed analyses for Spain and Italy. These analyses show how local patterns 
of concentration of migrants in specific Local Administrative Units relate to the presence of labour-
intensive agriculture with high demand for temporary work. The fourth chapter describes how the 
salience and attitudes towards immigration differ when considering respondents living in cities, 
medium and small size towns, and rural areas. Finally, the fifth chapter gives an overview of the 
main EU policies dealing with the integration of migrants in rural areas. 
While providing, to our knowledge one of the first quantitative analysis at EU level of migration in 
rural areas, our study faces the important limitation of under-representing the real size of the 
phenomenon and the vulnerability of migrants employed in agriculture. This limitation stems from 
the difficulty to capture in official statistics at EU level the temporariness and often-irregular nature 
of employment conditions of migrants in agriculture. Cases of exploitation of migrants labour, in 
particular for Italy and Spain, are extensively described in the more country-specific migration 
literature and repeatedly emerging in the news. 
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More detailed findings of the report are the following. 
Residential and territorial aspects 
• In the EU, migrants (defined as foreign-born) represent 14.5% of the total population living in 
cities in contrast to 10.2% living in towns and 5.5% in rural areas. These aggregate figures 
indicate that migrants tend to be overrepresented in cities in respect of towns and rural areas. 
However, when unpacking the data by single Member State it is possible to observe strong 
differences in relation to the tendency of migrants to settle in rural rather than urban areas. 
Among the Member States with a large population of migrants, this tendency is particularly 
pronounced in the case of Italy and Spain. 
• Among migrants from TC living in rural areas there is a higher share of less educated with respect 
to natives and to TC migrants and EU mobile citizens living in other areas. In addition, whilst for 
natives, TC migrants and EU mobile citizens in cities and towns there is an improvement of 
education levels at the aggregate level, this positive trend is not present in the case of TC 
migrants living in rural areas. 
• When considering indicators of integration, TC migrants in rural areas register a higher share of 
the population in lower income deciles and at risk of poverty.  Over time, the at-risk-of-poverty 
indicator is worsening in the case of EU mobile citizens in rural areas and in the case of TC 
migrants in all settlement types. 
• Across the Member States, there is strong variation in the difference between the risks of 
poverty of migrants versus natives living in rural areas. This gap, both for EU and TC migrants is 
particularly large in Spain and Italy, which have the largest absolute populations of migrants 
living in rural areas. 
• TC migrants in rural areas tend to be more disadvantaged in the labour market, as evidenced by 
higher unemployment rates compared to all other groups. At a single country level, the 
difference in unemployment rates between migrants and natives living in rural areas is generally 
lower for EU mobile citizens than for TC migrants. Large differences can be observed in particular 
for TC migrants in Spain, Greece France and Italy but also in Finland and Sweden. 
Labour market 
• The labour market analyses clearly indicate that the proportion of rural employment, which is 
filled by migrant workers, is gradually increasing over time. Between 2011 and 2017, for the 
whole EU there was an increase of from 4.3% to 6.5% in the share of migrants in total 
employment in the agricultural sector. This tendency is driven by Spain, Italy and Denmark 
where the share of migrants employed in agriculture is of several percentage points higher than 
the share of migrants employed in all other sectors. 
• In respect of natives, migrants employed in agriculture are more likely to work in elementary 
occupations, be employees and to have temporary forms of recruitment. 
• Although it is still early to evaluate the full quantitative scope of the Seasonal Workers Directive, 
the available data for 2017 shows that most of the seasonal workers’ permits in Spain, Italy and 
Estonia are issued for the agricultural sector. 
  
 6 
 
Geographically detailed analyses 
• The two case studies for Italy and Spain indicate that, in particular in the case of rural areas the 
population of migrants is expanding in areas where the population of natives is decreasing. 
Given the different sizes of the two population groups, the difference in trends does not 
necessarily imply compensation for the general population decline in those areas. 
• These case studies also show more clearly in respect of the EU aggregated statistics that migrant 
in rural areas tend to reside in areas where there are intensive agricultural production and a 
high degree of temporary employment. Other studies have also highlighted how these are also 
areas of extensive irregular employment and precarious living conditions.   
• Another case study in the report dedicated to the migration of Ukrainians to Poland highlights 
the need to complement European official statistics with national data to capture important 
flows linked to temporary migration. Temporary movements of Ukrainians to Poland represent 
the largest flow of work-related and short-term residence permits in the entire EU. These 
movements are partly explained by the pull factor of labour demand in agriculture and shaped 
by the intermediation of recruitment agencies and by special entry regimes for temporary 
migrations. 
Attitudes 
• The analysis in the fourth chapter, looking at the divide in attitudes between cities and rural 
areas, finds that areas of residence do not have a large influence on the perceived salience of 
migration. Small differences in attitudes about immigration between towns, cities and rural 
areas can be found, particularly when considering the disaggregated data for single countries.  
• Attitudes towards immigration are more clearly explained by the socio-demographic profile of 
respondents and in particular by their level of education age and occupation.  
Policies 
• Reliable data are necessary to support policy response. 
• In the field of integration of third-country nationals, the competence is shared between the EU 
and MSs, but these last ones remain primarily responsible for integration policies. The EU has 
been supporting MSs in their integration policies, through various initiatives and funds.  
• The presence of migrants in rural areas presents challenges (for example, remoteness, isolation, 
limited access to targeted services, and limited capacity to respond to inflows) and opportunities 
(for instance, to contrast depopulation dynamics and the lack of active labour force in specific 
sectors, innovative bottom-up solutions) for both third-country nationals and hosting 
communities. 
• The coordination of the European, national, regional, and local level is fundamental to 
implement properly the tools available to support both public authorities and the population to 
receive and integrate migrants. 
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Introduction 
Migration in EU rural areas: an understudied field 
The attention to migration in metropolitan areas has so far gone to the detriment to the analysis of 
migration processes involving rural areas and small towns. These processes, although less relevant 
in absolute terms and more specific in terms of affected regions, play a critical role in the 
transformation of agriculture and agro-food industries and may contrast depopulation trends in 
rural areas. In addition, there are signs that the divide between residents in rural and urban areas 
spilled over the social and political domains.  
While the study of rural migration has received extensive attention in the US, there are not many 
quantitative analyses addressing the rural dimension of migration at the EU level in recent times. 
Available studies are generally based on qualitative analyses and considering specific countries and 
migratory corridors. Some examples include analyses conducted for rural areas in Italy (Corrado 
2018), Spain (Hoggart and Mendoza 1999; Morén-Alegret and Solana 2012), Greece (Kasimis 2003; 
Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2005), Sweden (Hedberg and Haandrikman 2014) and more recently 
Poland (Górny and Kaczmarczyk 2018). Two books provide a compilation of several of these studies, 
respectively in an international context (Jentsch and Simard 2009) and with a special focus on the 
Mediterranean area (Corrado, de Castro, and Perrotta 2016). 
Immigration towards rural areas can be considered part of a more general trend of diversification 
of migration. This diversification is not only deriving from the increase in the variety of countries of 
origin but also from the fact that migrations are increasingly directed to countries and regions within 
countries which were not experiencing a high level of immigration in the past. A common challenge 
for these new immigration destinations is represented by the speed of change in ethnic diversity 
rather than by a large number of migrants. The rapid onset of migrants in areas, which were not 
traditionally confronted with high presence of migrants in the past, poses unique needs in terms of 
integration (Winders 2014). New immigration destinations normally lack dedicated infrastructure 
and services to cope with the influx of migrants; migrants cannot benefit from the formal and 
informal support from pre-existing migrants’ networks; and the domestic population may be less 
familiar and open to accept diversity. 
The available studies in the literature identify some key characteristics of the phenomenon of 
migration in rural areas. However, there are still important gaps in providing comparative statistical 
and quantitative analyses especially for the EU (Rye and Scott 2018). Such comparative analyses are 
essential for taking into account the specificities of migration in rural areas especially when 
developing policies at EU level. This report contributes to filling a gap in the quantitative analysis by 
providing a systematic overview of the available statistical knowledge on this phenomenon.  
Migration in rural areas in the context of a segmented labour market: why it is important  
Immigration to rural areas is particularly significant to show that the demand for temporary labour 
in agriculture still represents an important pull factor. Besides construction, tourism and domestic 
work, agriculture has played a fundamental role in determining immigration flows. The 
characteristics of the agricultural labour market entail a high dependency on seasonal and 
precarious labour, which is no longer supplied by the domestic labour force. Improvements in 
education, women’s emancipation and increasing aspirations opened opportunities to young 
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people and women from rural areas in developed economies to escape the option of accepting low-
paid jobs in agriculture. In an increasingly segmented labour market, immigration from low-income 
countries has become the solution to fill labour shortages in secondary sectors. This tendency is 
both socially and economically determined. Migrants especially when they view their position in the 
country as temporary are more likely to accept jobs of secondary social status, which locals tend to 
avoid (Alonso and Piore 1981). 
There are at least four reasons why migration in rural areas would deserve greater attention from 
research and policy. 
The first reason is linked to residential and territorial aspects. Migrants may settle in rural areas or 
peripheral area of large cities mainly due to the affordability of housing without necessarily working 
in agriculture. By substituting a dwindling native population in rural areas, they can play a 
fundamental role in maintaining the socio-economic viability of areas subject to depopulation and 
ageing. Many aspects of the demographic impacts of migration in rural areas are still poorly 
understood and represent an active field of research in spatial demography and rural sociology. 
Some of the questions being addressed relate to: the differences of international migrations in 
respect of other processes of counter-urbanisation and gentrification; the changes brought in 
identities and in social and demographic structure of rural communities; the effects linked to 
temporary, seasonal and circular forms of migration; and how to account for migration in regional 
development strategies (Hugo and Morén-Alegret 2008). 
The second reason relates to the contribution of migrants in the agricultural labour market. The 
industrialization, specialisation and intensification of agriculture since the mid of the 20th century 
have been accompanied by the reduction of employment in agriculture and a higher share of 
temporary and wage labour in respect of family labour. These needs for recruited labour have been 
increasingly met by employing foreign workers since the 1990s. These trends are particularly 
evident in the greenhouse, nursery, fruit and vegetable farming sectors, which remain labour-
intensive and require high inputs of labour in particular during the planting and harvesting periods.  
Evidence in several countries of the world shows that with economic development, agricultural 
employment is at the same time decreasing and becoming not elastic to variation in wages (Zahniser 
2018). This reflects the fact that the internal supply from domestic workers, who are less willing to 
work in agriculture, cannot satisfy the demand in agricultural labour. Under these conditions, labour 
demand is matched either through mechanization or with the import of agricultural labour from 
countries at an earlier stage of development and with more elastic farm labour supply (Taylor and 
Charlton 2019). The fact that migrants complement rather than compete with local agricultural 
workers is shown by the experience of Mexican bracero workers in the United States in the mid-
1960s. The discontinuation of the bracero program represented an abrupt and strong reduction in 
the share of Mexican workers in seasonal farm work in the US. This abrupt interruption of a decades-
long immigration programme, rather than producing changes in farm wages and increase the 
recruitment of domestic workers, resulted in the mechanization of some sector (such as in tomatoes 
production) and in the shifting of production to less labour intensive sectors, in cases where 
mechanization was not yet economically or technically viable (Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018).  
More recently, in the US there is a rising concern that restrictions in immigration, enforcement of 
immigration law, and larger demand for agricultural work in Mexico could mean the end of farm 
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labour abundance (Zahniser 2018). Similar concerns are emerging in the case of migration from 
Ukraine to Poland and for UK in relation to Brexit1. In this case changes in the temporary migration 
legislation in 2017, the entry into force of the EU Seasonal Workers Directive (European Union 
2014), and the immigrants’ preference to work in other sectors than agriculture may explain a 
reduction in the number of temporary permits used in agriculture (see Box 2). 
The third aspect supporting the importance of migration in rural areas is linked to the specific needs 
for integration posed by the temporary nature of work and by the often-illegal status of migrants 
employed in agriculture. Several studies (see review in Rye and Scott 2018) provide ample evidence 
indicating how illegality, poor working conditions, and the dependency from the role of 
intermediaries for recruitment, are defining characteristics of employment of migrants in 
agriculture. Given these characteristics, migrants in rural areas represent a predominantly 
vulnerable group, which would deserve particular attention when formulating social inclusion 
policies. At the same time, the often-transitory nature of employment in agriculture may hinder any 
attempt of stabilisation and integration in the longer term. The challenges posed by the integration 
can therefore be summarised in the need to provide special attention to vulnerable groups which 
are however difficult to recognise and target given the transitory nature of the work in agriculture.  
The fourth reason is related to the different attitudes towards immigration that can be encountered 
across cities, towns and rural areas. Several analyses in the political science and electoral studies 
literature indicate that these differences need to be framed in a divide between cosmopolitan and 
parochial attitudes rather than along the traditional ideological categories of left versus right and 
liberal versus conservatives (De Vries 2018). The divide in attitudes may be explained by two sets of 
factors:  
• socio-demographic factors, which bring people with more cosmopolitan views to reside in cities 
rather than in rural areas (Maxwell 2019) and;  
• characteristics of the areas themselves and in particular the higher rate of change in ethnic 
diversity and the more adverse consequences of globalization experienced in recent years by 
rural areas (van Gent, Jansen, and Smits 2014). 
 
The content and limitations of this report  
This report provides a quantitative analysis of migration in EU rural areas mainly based on data from 
the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC). These two surveys represent the main sources to monitor the integration of migrants 
available at EU level. They provide a breakdown of the resident population by degrees of 
urbanization – namely, cities, towns, and rural areas – and by sector of employment. The report 
includes a series of descriptive statistics comparing shares of population and basic integration 
indicators by migratory status, place of residence and sector of work. To this, the report adds a 
further empirical section dedicated to attitudes towards immigration in rural areas and a final 
chapter providing an overview of EU policies on the integration of migrants in rural areas. 
                                                      
1 See the following links for examples of news reporting about shortages of migrants’ labour in agriculture: 
https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/uk-suffers-from-shortage-of-seasonal-fruit-pickers-this-summer 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/brexit-worries-make-seasonal-hiring-harder-for-u-k-farmers  
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/07/27/if-america-is-overrun-by-low-skilled-migrants  
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2018/04/13/Global-issue-for-agricultural-foreign-workers 
https://www.novinite.com/articles/196132/Lack+of+Bulgarian+and+Romanian+Migrants+Could+Lead+to+Shortage+of+British+Asparagus 
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The report is structured as follows: 
• Chapter 1 describes residential aspects looking at the characteristics and social conditions of 
three population groups of natives, migrants from the Member States and migrants from Third 
Countries, across three degrees of urbanisation of cities, towns and rural areas; 
• Chapter 2 considers the situation of migrants employed in agriculture in comparison with those 
employed in other sectors; 
• Chapter 3 includes a more geographically detailed analysis for Spain and Italy showing how local 
patterns of concentration of migrants in specific Local Administrative Units relate to the 
characteristics of agriculture; 
• Chapter 4 describes how the salience and attitudes towards migration, expressed in 
Eurobarometer surveys, change between respondents living in cities, medium and small size 
towns, and rural areas; 
• Chapter 5 gives an overview of the main EU policies dealing with the integration of migrants in 
rural areas. 
 
Migrants in rural areas are a smaller group with respect to those living in cities, and their conditions 
of employment are often characterised by informal contracts and irregular work. Because of this, 
the statistical data sources available at the EU level and used in this report entail the risk of under-
representation of the real size of the phenomenon. More detailed analyses available in the 
literature for specific countries and regions provide ample evidence about the precariousness of the 
conditions of migrants employed in agriculture. 
Significant numbers of migrants in rural areas are currently found in several Member States such as 
Sweden, France and Germany. However the report examines more in-depth the cases of Italy and 
Spain, since in these countries, together with Greece, migration in rural areas coincides with 
employment in agriculture2.  
The main benefit of this report lies in providing, to the best of our knowledge, one of the first 
quantitative, EU-wide overviews of migration in rural areas. This overview highlights the importance 
of migration for the agricultural economy and in contrasting demographic trends in specific regions. 
It contributes to raising awareness on the fact that migrants residing in rural areas and working in 
agriculture are a particularly vulnerable group. One of the main conclusion of the report is that the 
temporariness of employment in agriculture and comparatively lower performance along most of 
the immigrants’ integration indicators make integration in rural areas at the same time necessary 
but difficult to target through policies. The challenge to integrate migrants in rural areas is amplified 
by the fact that they are geographically circumscribed to specific regions and to areas that until 
recently have not experienced the public policy issues related to the presence of immigrant 
communities. 
  
                                                      
2 For several decades after the Second World War, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have been primarily countries of emigration, supplying labour 
for the more industrialised Northern European countries (for an overview, see Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Bade 2003; Bade and Eijl 2011; 
Castles 2006). Such international migrations from Southern European countries occurred in parallel with  internal movement  of large shares of the 
population from rural areas to industrial cities (King et al. 2000). Since the 1970s, the economy of Southern European countries converged with 
Northern Europe while maintaining some unique characteristics. Their economy has remained centred on small enterprises in agriculture, tourism 
and services with high levels of informal labour and a dualism between primary and secondary labour markets. Since the 1980s, Southern European 
countries have become at the same time countries of origins and new immigration destinations, attracting an increasing number of migrants from 
Northern Africa, Asia, Southern America and Eastern Europe. 
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 Migrants living in rural areas 
This chapter presents sociodemographic characteristics and main indicators of integration of 
migrants taking the perspective of the type of area of residence. We analyse a set of indicators 
relative to the following three subgroups of population: natives (as the benchmark), EU mobile 
citizens, and migrants from Third Countries. These groups are compared across areas of residence 
classified according to the three degrees of urbanisation: cities, towns and rural areas. Besides basic 
demographic indicators such as age structure, education, and length of residence, in order to 
describe the economic conditions of migrants we use three further indicators: income distribution, 
share of population below the risk of poverty threshold, and overcrowding rate3. Unemployment 
figures at EU aggregate and Member State levels are included in the analyses. These analyses are 
based on microdata from the EU-LFS, covering the period 2011-2017, and from the EU-SILC, 
covering the period 2011-2016 (see Box 1 for a more detailed description of data sources). 
                                                      
3 For the choice of the indicators we referred to the list of indicators proposed by Zaragoza declaration on the integration of migrants and reports 
monitoring migrant integration in the EU such as (Albertinelli and Statistical Office of the European Communities 2011), ,(OECD and European Union 
2018). 
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Box 1 Datasets used and related limitations 
The two main data sources used in Chapters 1 to 3 are the EU-LFS and EU-SILC. These two data sources are 
characterised by a high degree of harmonization and are regularly used to monitor migrants’ integration in the EU. 
According to information provided by Eurostat, the two surveys are designed to optimise data comparability among 
Member States. However, there are certain limitations to consider while interpreting figures derived from these 
surveys. Both surveys target the whole resident population and not specifically the migrants, leading to the following 
coverage issues4: 
• “Recently arrived migrants: this group of migrants is missing from the sampling frame in every hosting country, 
resulting in under-coverage of the actual migrant population in the EU-LFS and EU-SILC. 
• Collective households: the two surveys only cover private households. Persons living in collective households 
and in institutions for asylum seekers and migrant workers are excluded from the target population. This also 
results in under-coverage of migrants in the survey. 
• Non-response of migrant population: a significant disadvantage of the surveys lies in the fact that a high 
percentage of the migrant population does not respond to them. This may be due to language difficulties, 
misunderstanding of the purpose of each survey, arduousness in communicating with the interviewer, and fear 
on behalf of migrants of a possible negative impact on their authorisation to remain in the country after 
participating in the surveys. 
• Sample size: given the nature of the EU-LFS and EU-SILC as sample surveys, these cannot fully capture the 
characteristics of migrants in Member States with very low migrant populations.5 
• Information on country of citizenship and country of birth: this information is asked from all persons aged 15 
or older in private households sampled in the EU-LFS and in the EU-SILC for those aged 16 and over. This results 
in an under-estimation of the number of migrants by country of citizenship and country of birth”. 
 
Both the EU-LFS and EU-SILC provide information on the degree of urbanisation of Local Administrative Units of 
residence of the respondent. This categorisation of Local Administrative Units is based on the population density in 
clusters of 1 km² grid cells6. Depending on the share of the population living in the different types of cluster, the 
Local Administrative Units are classified into three degrees of urbanisation. 
• Cities (densely populated areas): at least 50% of the population lives in high-density clusters. 
• Towns and suburbs (intermediate density areas): less than 50% of the population lives in rural grid cells and 
less than 50% lives in high-density clusters. 
• Rural areas (thinly populated areas): more than 50% of the population lives in rural grid cells. 
 
The classification of Local Administrative Units as rural based on population density does not necessarily coincide 
with the agricultural nature of production in the areas. In fact, EU-LFS suggests that about 68% of those employed in 
agriculture reside in rural areas while 25% reside in towns and 7% in cities. A final limitation in this report is related 
to the fact that these surveys not necessarily cover individuals irregularly present on Member States’ territory or 
seasonal workers – two migrant categories that are particularly relevant in the agriculture sector.  
 
  
                                                      
4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migrant-integration/methodology 
5 When processing the statistics by EU Member States and other segmentations, such as the degree of urbanization and employment in agriculture, 
the sample size referring to the migrants’ population may become progressively less representative. 
6 For more details, see Territorial typologies by Eurostat. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Territorial_typologies#Typologies. Last accessed 15 May 2019. 
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Share of migrants by degree of urbanisation 
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of foreign population in cities, towns and rural areas over time and 
by origin based on two definitions: country of birth and country of citizenship. 
 
Figure 1.1 Share and absolute number of foreign population by origin (country of birth and citizenship) and degree of 
urbanisation, EU (2011 - 2017).7  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
The comparison demonstrates that the definition has a significant impact on the resulting 
distribution of population. In rural areas, TC migrants are significantly higher both the absolute and 
relative numbers if migrants are counted according to a country of birth definition (2.7 vs 1.5 million 
in 2017). Instead, the discrepancy detected for EU mobile citizens is lower (2.3 vs 1.7 million in 
2017). This is at least partially explained by the reluctance of EU citizens to acquire another Member 
State citizenship, unlike TC nationals who might be more willing to naturalise as the EU citizenship 
grants a set of residence and freedom of movement rights89. 
In 2017, EU and TC migrants represented, respectively, 2.6% and 2.9% of the total population living 
in rural areas. This contrasts with 4.4% for EU mobile citizens and 10% for TC migrants in the case 
of cities, 4.2% for EU mobile citizens and 6% for TC migrants in towns10.  
The trends since 2011 show that the share of the population of migrants in towns and cities was 
increasing, whereas in rural areas it was stable. Between 2011 and 2017, the native population 
                                                      
7 Germany is not included in this and other figures presenting time series of EU-LFS data for the period 2011-2017 since until 2016 Germany was not 
providing statistics with a breakdown of the population by country of birth or citizenship. 
8 Throughout the report, we adopted country of birth criterion to define migrants distinguishing between the following two groups: ‘TC migrants’ 
stands for individuals born in a non-EU country; ‘EU migrants’ stands for individuals born in another EU Member State. In some cases, clearly flagged 
in the report, the nationality criterion is used. 
9 Second generation migrants are not included in these two migrant categories regardless of having citizenship of the destination country. Please, 
note that none of the EU Member States grants automatic and unconditional citizenship to children born in their territories to foreign citizens (Global 
Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship - Globalcit n.d.). 
10 These figures do not coincide with those reported in Figure 1.1 as the latter one does not include Germany.  
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residing in rural areas decreased from 106.8 to 100 million. The number of EU and TC migrants 
residing in rural areas has remained relatively stable at 2.4 and 2.7 million respectively.  
These figures at aggregate level indicate that migrants are more likely to live in cities and towns 
rather than rural areas. However, the shares of population in rural areas that are migrants varies 
significantly when considering figures by Member States as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Share of migrants in rural areas by origin and Member States (2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
Note: figures for Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) 
number of observation in the EU-LFS.  
 
The share of foreign-born is below the EU aggregate in Poland, Czechia, Finland and Lithuania. The 
top five countries with the highest presence of migrants’ population in rural areas in relative terms 
are Luxemburg (40.0%), Cyprus (15.1%), Sweden (14.9%), Ireland (11.9%) and Germany (9.6%).  
The share of TC migrants in rural areas is the highest in Sweden (9.9%), Luxembourg (7.3%) and 
Croatia (6.5%), while the share of EU mobile citizens in rural areas is the highest in Luxembourg 
(32.7%), Cyprus and Ireland (9.7% each) followed by Belgium (5.3%), Austria (5.1%) and Germany 
(5.1%). 
Figure 1.3 captures the propensity of migrants to settle in rural areas versus cities by showing the 
difference between the share of migrants in the total population living in rural areas and the share 
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of migrants in the total population living in cities in each Member State. The vertical axes represent 
this gap in percentage points (pp). A negative value indicates that migrants are over-represented in 
cities with respect to rural areas11. The dark blue colour stands for the year 2017, while the shading 
represents previous years going from light to darker over time. The size of the circle is proportional 
to the size of the migrants’ population in rural areas.  
 
Figure 1.3 Difference between the share of migrants in total population living in rural areas and the share of migrants in 
total population living in cities by Member State (2011-2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
Notes: figures for Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) 
number of observation in the EU-LFS.  
 
                                                      
11 For example in the case of Germany 22% of the population in cities is represented by migrants and 10% in rural areas. This is resulting in a difference 
of  -12 pp. 
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In general, across the EU the migrants more often settle in cities rather than in rural areas. The gap 
between the two shares was around six pp in 2011. It has widened further reaching nine pp by 2017. 
Both the observed gap and its dynamics vary significantly across Member States. In Poland and 
Hungary, the concentration of migrants is similar across types of settlement. The widest gap (more 
than 20 pp) is observed for Austria and Belgium. Italy and Spain have high absolute numbers of 
migrants living in rural areas and a small difference in the share between rural areas and cities. On 
the contrary, UK, France and Germany have large migrant populations living in rural areas but these 
populations represent low shares compared to those residing in cities. 
Between 2011 and 2017, the Member States’ specific gaps remained either stable or further 
widened. The gap widened the most in Ireland, Slovenia, Austria and Belgium. The opposite is 
observed for Portugal, Greece and Latvia. In the case of Spain, there was an increasing trend for 
migrants to settle more in rural areas between 2011 and 2016, which was reversed in 2017. In the 
case of the UK, it is possible to notice a constant trend for migrants to settle in cities rather than in 
rural areas. 
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Age 
Figure 1.4 gives a representation of the age structure of the different population groups by degree 
of urbanisation of the place of residence. Age brackets are grouped in two classes of working versus 
not working age to facilitate the detection of differences in age dependency ratios across population 
groups. 
 
Figure 1.4 Share of working age population in total population by origin and degree of urbanisation, EU (2011- 2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
The relative weight of working age population varies across origin groups. The share of working age 
population is the lowest among natives (63%) and it demonstrates a decreasing trend between 2011 
and 2017. This evidence points to the phenomenon of ageing of population in the EU. The share of 
working age population is the highest among TC migrants regardless of the type of settlement (85%). 
Slightly lower values are recorded in the case of EU mobile citizens (73-79%).  
The fact that the immigrant populations – both EU mobile citizens and TC – have higher shares of 
working age population points to the positive demographic effects in contrasting an ageing trend 
among the natives. However, these effects do not appear to have different relevance in rural areas 
with respect to towns and cities.  
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Education 
Figure 1.5 presents different population groups by two education levels: low education corresponds 
to lower secondary (ISCED 0-3), and high and medium education corresponds to upper secondary 
and third level of studies (ISCED 4-8)12. 
 
Figure 1.5 Share of population by education levels, origin and degree of urbanisation, EU (2011 - 2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
The share of people with low education levels among natives is the lowest in cities (less than 1/3 of 
population). It has decreased over time in all types of settlements. The decrease is particularly 
evident for natives living in rural areas: from 40% in 2011, to 36.8% in 2017. 
In the case of EU mobile citizens, the share of less educated people is lower with respect to other 
population groups in all settlement types. Between 2011 and 2017, it declined in cities and towns 
by approximately seven pp compared to a decline of three pp in rural areas.  
The share of people with lower education level is higher among TC migrants in all three types of 
settlements and compared to both natives and EU mobile citizens. The highest figures are observed 
for those residing in rural areas - above 45%. While the share of low educated among TC migrants 
decreased in cities and towns, it remained stable in rural areas.  
                                                      
12 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) is the reference international classification for organising education programmes and 
related qualifications by levels and fields. For more details, see Eurostat Statistics Explained Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=International_Standard_Classification_of_Education_(ISCED). Last accessed on 27 May  2019.  
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Length of residence 
Figure 1.6 compares the length of residence between the two groups of migrants from EU and TC. 
A high share of migrants with many years of residence in the country may be indicative of the fact 
that the migrant population is stabilising. 
 
Figure 1.6 Share of migrant population by length of stay, origin and degree of urbanisation (2011 - 2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
For both groups (EU and TC migrants) the share of those with length of residence of more than 10 
years has increased in all types of settlement. The growth is more prominent for EU mobile citizens 
in rural areas (from 51 to 72%). For both origin groups those residing in rural areas for more than 
ten years constitute more than 70% in 2017.  
While the share of EU mobile citizens with the length of residence up to two years residing in rural 
areas has remained relatively stable (5%), the figure for TC migrants increased both in absolute and 
relative terms from 2014 onwards. From 2011 to 2017, the number of TC migrants in the considered 
group increased from 113 000 to 185 000 (by 2.6 pp). The rise of the share of recently arrived TC 
migrants in rural areas may signal an expansion of migration to rural areas or a higher incidence of 
temporary migration. 
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Income 
Figure 1.7 is based on Member States’ specific income distribution in deciles. For our purposes, an 
individual is considered to have a low income if his/her monthly (take home) pay from their main 
job is within the first two deciles of the income distribution13. 
 
Figure 1.7 Share of population in lower income deciles by origin and degree of urbanisation (2011 - 2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
The share of population with low income is the lowest among natives living in cities (17.1% in 2017). 
The figures are only slightly higher in towns (18.8% in 2017) and in rural areas (21.5% in 2017). 
The corresponding figures for migrants are significantly higher. In rural areas, the share of EU and 
TC migrants with low income was approximately 30% in 2011 with no major difference between the 
two groups. Some positive dynamics over time are recorded for EU and TC migrants living in cities 
and towns, while the picture is more constant in the case of migrants living in rural areas. 
  
                                                      
13 Please, note that this indicator based on EU-LFS is included to complement the information provided by the share if population at risk of poverty 
from the EU-SILC. The two are not directly comparable. Moreover, for the first indicator (the share of population in the first quintile of income 
distribution) the underlying EU-LFS variable (INCDECIL -the only variable capturing the income level of the respondents) Eurostat warns that the 
variable has comparability issues and hence analyses intending to use income information from the EU-LFS are hence possible to a limited extent 
only. For more information see, the EU Labour Force Survey Database User Guide. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6037342/EULFS-Database-UserGuide.pdf. Last accessed 16 May 2019 
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Risk of poverty 
Figure 1. shows the share of population at risk of poverty based on information coming from the 
EU-SILC. This variable is one of the most commonly used indicators to measure the level of living 
conditions of the EU population. It relates to one of the five headline targets of the Europe 2020, to 
reduce poverty by lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by 
2020. 
 
Figure 1.8 Population with disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold by origin and degree of 
urbanisation, EU (2011-2016). 
Note: The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is equal to 60% of median of the disposable income. Slovenia and the Netherlands 
are not included due to missing information regarding the degree of urbanisation. Source: own elaboration of EU-SILC 
microdata. 
 
The share of those with disposable income below the threshold of risk of poverty is the lowest for 
natives living in cities and towns (14%) and slightly higher in rural areas (19%).  
Residents in rural areas are generally at higher risk of poverty compared with those living in towns 
and cities. TC migrants are at the highest risk of poverty in all three types of settlement.  
When considering the trend over the period 2011-2017, the indicator is relatively stable in the case 
of natives and EU mobile citizens living in cities and towns, while it is worsening among EU and TC 
migrants living in rural areas. In these cases, the share of those at risk of poverty increased over the 
considered period reaching 28% and 34% respectively. 
Figure 1.9 provides the same statistics about the share of population at risk of poverty in 2017, by 
single Member State and focusing on the population living in rural areas. In particular, the charts 
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compare on the two axes the risk of poverty of migrants (EU on the left and TC on the right vertical 
axes) and natives (horizontal axis). The more countries are distant from the diagonal and towards 
the upper part of the graph, the more their population of migrants living in rural areas is 
disadvantaged in respect of natives in the same country. In other words, the distance from the 
diagonal can be interpreted as the gap between migrants and natives in terms of poverty once 
taking into account the poverty level of natives in the same country. 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Comparison of the risk of poverty indicators between and natives and migrants in rural areas, by country 
(2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-SILC microdata. 
Note: The more distant are the values from the diagonal, the more migrants are disadvantaged with respect to natives. 
The size of circles is proportional to the underlying migrants’ population of a country. Figures on the left pane for 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia as well as on the right pane for Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary 
Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) number of observation in the EU-SILC.  
 
In most of the Member States, both EU and TC migrants have a relatively higher risk of poverty if 
compared to the native populations. Some exceptions are EU mobile citizens in UK and TC migrants 
in UK and France. 
The gap is generally higher for TC migrants with respect to EU mobile citizens. Among countries with 
larger populations of migrants (captured by the size of the circles), the gap in poverty between 
natives and EU mobile citizens is particularly high in Spain (31.6 pp), Austria (22.4 pp) and Italy (18.4 
pp). In the case of TC migrants, the highest gaps are recorded in Sweden (33.1 pp), Austria (28.9 pp), 
Spain (27. 8 pp) and Italy (19.1 pp). 
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Overcrowding 
Another indicator often used to measure the level of integration of migrants is the overcrowding 
rate shown in Figure 1.10. This indicator provides an indirect measure of financial resources 
available to households. A person is considered as living in an overcrowded household if the 
household does not have an appropriate number of rooms with respect to the size of the 
household14. 
 
 
Figure 1.10 Overcrowding rate by origin and degree of urbanisation, EU (2011-2016).  
Source: own elaboration of EUSILC microdata. 
 
While for all three origin groups the overcrowding rate is higher in cities, for TC migrants it is equally 
high in all three types areas of residence – more than one fourth of households in this group. The 
overcrowding rate of TC migrants has increased since 2014 in particular in towns and rural areas 
reaching around 28% in 2016.  
The percentage of EU mobile citizens who live in overcrowded residential units is higher in cities 
and towns. Interestingly, it is relatively modest in rural areas – only 13% that is the lowest in all 
origin and settlement type groups15.   
                                                      
14 According to Eurostat definition a person is considered as living in an overcrowded household if the household does not have at its disposal a 
minimum of rooms equal to: room for the household; one room per couple in the household; one room for each single person aged 18 and more; 
one room per pair of single people of the same gender between 12 and 17 years of age; one room for each single person between 12 and 17 years of 
age and not included in the previous category; one room per pair of children under 12 years of age. 
15 As it is indicated in Box 1, the obtained results refer to private households only  as collective households are excluded from the underlying survey. 
This might bias the overall picture especially if collective households are characterised by higher overcrowding rate or inequally present in cities, 
towns and rural areas.   
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Unemployment 
Figure 1.11 presents the employment status of the active population by origin and settlement types. 
The employment gap between natives and migrants is one of the most used measures of integration 
of migrants. 
 
Figure 1.11 Employment status of the active population by origin and degree of urbanisation, EU (2011 - 2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
For all three groups, the unemployment rate peaked in 2013, after which it gradually returned to 
levels below those observed in 2011. The highest figures are detected for TC migrants in rural areas 
(24%). While for natives, the unemployment rate is currently higher in cities than in towns and in 
rural areas, for EU mobile citizens and TCs it is higher in towns and rural areas (above 10 and 17% 
respectively). 
Looking exclusively at 2017, we can notice the following:  
• the unemployment rate of natives across the types of settlements is similar (approximately 
eight per cent); 
• the unemployment rate of EU mobile citizens is in line with the one of natives in cities, 
slightly higher in towns (1 pp) and the highest in rural areas (3 pp); 
• the unemployment rate among TC migrants is higher compared to the other two groups in 
all three types of settlements; 
• the unemployment rate in rural areas is the highest for TC migrants (17%), compared to EU 
mobile citizens (10%) and natives (7%). 
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Figure 1.12 demonstrates the heterogeneity of the unemployment rate gap between origin groups 
(EU and TC migrants each compared to natives) among those living in rural areas across Member 
States. In general, the unemployment rate of TC migrants (right pane - more dispersed) diverges 
from that of natives more than the unemployment rate of EU mobile citizens does (left pane - more 
compact).  
•  
 
Figure 1.12 Unemployment rate in rural areas, EU mobile citizens and TC migrants vs natives (2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
Note: the size of circles is proportional to the active populations of migrants. Figures for Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) number of 
observation in the EU-LFS. 
 
The largest gap is observed for TC migrants in Sweden followed by Finland and Spain – 18, 17 and 
14 pp respectively. The exception is Cyprus where in rural areas the unemployment rate among TC 
migrants is lower than among natives. 
With the exception of Latvia and the Netherlands, the unemployment rate of EU mobile citizens 
stands in the range of what is observed for natives. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Slovenia the unemployment rate for EU mobile citizens is equal to the one of natives. In the UK and 
Portugal, identical unemployment rates are observed for all three groups: 7 and 3% respectively. 
While looking at the unemployment rate gap between TC migrants and EU mobile citizens. Most of 
the time the unemployment rate for EU mobile citizens is lower than for TC migrants. The largest 
gap is observed in Sweden (22 vs 7%), Finland (24 vs 7%), and France (18 vs 8%).  
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 Migrants working in agriculture 
Share of migrants working in agriculture  
 
Figure 2.1 Total population employed in agriculture, by origin, EU (2011, 2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
The share of EU and TC migrants in the total employment16 in agriculture was very limited in 2011: 
1.6 and 2.7 % respectively. Between 2011 and 2017, both the relative and absolute figures changed 
significantly. The total number of people employed in agriculture in EU decreased by more than a 
million: from 10.1 to 8.9 (equivalent to 12% of 2011). This decrease is exclusively due to natives. In 
2017, there were 1.3 million fewer natives employed in agriculture with respect to 2011 (13% 
decrease). This was only partially compensated by EU and TC migrants: the two groups increased by 
58.5 (36 % increase) and 83.7 (31% increase) thousands respectively. The combined effect of the 
outflow of native and the inflow EU mobile citizens and TC migrants led to an increase of two pp in 
the share of non-natives among those involved in agriculture.  
                                                      
16 Based on EU-LFS statistics and ILO definition, Eurostat classifies individuals ‘in three categories as employed, unemployed and economically 
inactive’. When referring to ‘total population in employment’, or simply ‘total employment’, we refer to the first of those abovementioned categories. 
The reader should not confound these expressions with those identifying specific ‘professional statuses’, again as defined by Eurostat, such as 
‘employees, self-employed persons and family workers’. The latter are treated in a section below, namely ‘Professional status’ (page 30). A detailed 
description of the terminology is available on the Eurostat website (Eurostat 2019). 
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Immigrants’ employment in agriculture compared to other sectors 
Figure 2.2 captures the extent to which immigrants tend to work in agriculture as compared to all 
other economic sectors, by Member State. The dark blue colour stands for the year 2017, while 
lighter shades represent previous years. The size of the circle is proportional to the absolute number 
of migrants employed in agriculture. A positive gap is recorded when the share of migrants in total 
employed in the agriculture sector is higher than the share of migrants in total employed in all other 
sectors. The vertical axis represents this gap in pp. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Difference between the share of migrants working in agriculture and the share of migrants in all other sectors 
(2011-2017).  
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
Note: The size of the circle is proportional to the number of migrants employed in agriculture. Figures for Bulgaria, Malta, 
Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited number of observation in the LFS.  
 
The figure shows that in the majority of Member States the share of migrants among total employed 
in agriculture is lower than their shares in all other sectors pooled together. The exceptions are 
Spain, Italy and Denmark where the percentage of migrants among total employed in agriculture is 
from 6 to 9 pp higher compared to other sectors (2017). Over time, this positive gap was oscillating 
around nine pp in Spain, whilst it is widening in Italy and Denmark. The largest negative differentials 
(more than 10 pp) are observed in Sweden, Ireland and Austria. Looking at the time perspective, we 
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can notice that some negative differentials are closing, namely in Greece, Croatia, Netherlands, 
France, Portugal, while widening in UK, Sweden, Ireland and Austria. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Employed in agriculture by origin in Denmark, Spain, and Italy (2011-2017). 
Source: own elaboration of LFS data. 
 
In Denmark, the share of migrants employed in agriculture steadily increased from 10 to 20% 
between 2011 and 2017. About 14% of those employed in agriculture are coming from another 
Member State (compared to 6% in 2011), and 5 % from non-EU European countries (2017) (Figure 
2.3).  
In Spain, the share of foreign workers employed in agriculture increased from 20 to 25% over the 
considered period, with a decline of 2014. While in 2013, the economic downturn in Spain resulted 
in the outflow of migrants from sectors where they were primarily employed (e.g. construction 
sector) the figure demonstrates that agriculture continued to attract migrants. This is pointing to 
the countercyclical nature of the agricultural sector. Moreover, it is possible to observe that in Spain 
(as well as in Denmark) there was an increase of EU mobile citizens in agriculture sector after the 
restriction for labour mobility of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens were lifted in 2014. In 2017, 
approximately 7% of those employed in agriculture were coming from another Member State, 7% 
from North Africa, and 7% from Central and South America. 
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In Italy, the share of migrant workers employed in agriculture steadily increased from 15 to 20% 
over the entire considered period. Compared with Denmark and Spain, in Italy the origin of migrants 
employed in agriculture is more diverse. In 2017, about 8% of those employed in agriculture are 
coming from another Member State, 4% from non-EU European countries, 4% come from Asia and 
3% from Northern Africa. 
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Gender  
Figure 2.4 illustrates the differences in gender compositions across sectors and origin groups. While 
non-agricultural sectors are gender balanced for all origin groups, the agriculture sector is 
characterised by a significant prevalence of men and this pattern reinforced over time. The share of 
men among natives and EU mobile citizens employed in agriculture was more than 60% in 2011 and 
it further increased, reaching 66% in 2017. More than three-fourths of all TC migrants employed in 
agriculture are men.  
 
Figure 2.4 Share of employed in agriculture by origin and sex, EU (2011-2017). 
Source: own elaboration of LFS data. 
 
The spikes observed for EU and TC migrants in agriculture, respectively in 2013 and 2014, are 
explained by changes in origin composition of migrants in Spain and the UK. These changes are 
driven by the decline in the number of North African migrants (who are mostly men) and the inflow 
of more gender-balanced flows of EU mobile citizens after the restriction for labour mobility of 
citizens of the EU enlargement countries were lifted in 2011 and 2014. 
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Figure 2.5 Share employed in agriculture by detailed origin and sex, EU (2017). 
Source: own elaboration of LFS data. 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates how the origin of migrants is an important factor in defining the gender 
composition of those employed in agriculture. Among natives, EU mobile citizens and migrants 
coming from Central and South America the share of men among those employed in agriculture is 
about 65%. It is significantly higher among migrants coming from non-EU European countries (71%), 
Asians (81%). North African migrants working in agriculture are almost exclusively men (92%).  
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Type of occupation  
 
Figure 2.6 Share of employed in agriculture by occupation and origin, EU (2011-2017).  
Source: own elaboration of LFS data. 
 
Figure 2.6 displays the distribution of those employed in agriculture based on ISCO occupational 
classification and country of origin17. It points to large occupational discrepancies between natives 
and immigrants in the agriculture sector. Among natives, while 75% of the employees are classified 
as ‘skilled agriculture, forestry and fishery workers’, only 11% are categorised as ‘Elementary 
occupations’. Conversely, only slightly more than a quarter of TC migrants and one-third of EU 
mobile citizens are qualified as ‘Skilled agriculture, forestry and fishery workers occupational group’. 
Moreover, the share of EU mobile citizens and TC migrants in ‘Elementary occupations’ is five and 
six times higher than for natives. 
                                                      
17 The ISCO-08 divides jobs into ten major groups: Managers (ISCO 1); Professional(ISCO 2); Technicians and associate professionals (ISCO 3); Clerical 
support workers (ISCO 4); Service and sales workers (ISCO 5); Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers (ISCO 6); Craft and related trades 
workers (ISCO 7); Plant and machine operators, and assemblers (ISCO 8); Elementary occupations (ISCO 9); and Armed forces occupations (ISCO 10 - 
excluded). More information is available at: https://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/index.htm (Last accessed 14 May 2019). 
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Professional status 
 
Figure 2.7 Share of employed in agriculture by professional status and origin, EU (2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata. 
 
Figure 2.7 indicates that more than half of natives employed in agriculture sectors are self-employed 
and 16% are ‘family workers’, leaving only 27% as employed. The share of employed among EU 
mobile citizens and TC migrants is three times higher compared to natives (almost 90%). The share 
of self-employed among EU and TC migrants is more than five times lower with respect to natives 
(approximately 10-11%). Less than two per cent of foreigners is family workers. 
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Incidence of temporary employment  
 
Figure 2.8 Incidence of temporary employment by sector and origin, EU (2011-2017). 
Source: own elaboration of LFS data. 
 
The share of those having temporary jobs is higher in agriculture compared to other sectors (Figure 
2.8). This is true both across origin groups and over time.  
The incidence of temporary employment in agriculture was the lowest among natives in 2011 and 
it remained stable over the considered period (about 30 %). Among EU mobile citizens, it was 41% 
in 2011 and increased to 53% in 2017. Approximately 60% of TC migrants employed in agriculture 
had temporary jobs in 2017, up from more than half in 2011.  
Overall, the agricultural sector appears to be more exposed to temporary jobs. This can be the result 
of the peculiarities of the sector (e.g. seasonal patterns of work). However, the degree of this 
exposure is not equal across origin groups. Both EU and TC migrants are more frequently employed 
in temporary jobs, and this trend is growing over time. 
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Authorisations for the purpose of seasonal work 
 
Figure 2.9 Distribution of authorisations for the purpose of seasonal work in Spain, Italy and Estonia (2017). 
Source: own elaboration of EUROSTAT data on seasonal work (migr_rssw2). 
 
In 2014, the EU adopted the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU) which is aimed at 
harmonising Member States’ laws regarding the entry, stay and certain labour rights of non-EU 
seasonal workers, preventing exploitation as well as meeting labour market needs for seasonal work 
in the EU. The Directive was adopted in 2014 and should have been implemented by the Member 
States by 30 September 201618. The Fitness Check on the EU Legislation on Legal Migration adopted 
on 29 March 201919 states that in view of the recent implementation dates, only a partial evaluation 
was possible in the case of the Seasonal Workers Directive. The statistics on authorisations issued 
for the purpose of seasonal work were first released in 2018 for the 2017 reference year20. Out of 
10 795 authorisations reported by Eurostat for 2017, 9 088 (84.1%) were issued for the agriculture 
sector. Out of those issued for the agriculture sector, 63 % were issued by Spain, 25 % by Italy, and 
                                                      
18 Please note that the UK, Ireland and Denmark are not bound by this Directive.  
19 SWD (2019) 1055 
20 Eurostat, Authorisations issued for the purpose of seasonal work by economic sector, sex and citizenship [migr_ressw2]. The statistics on first 
permits issued for remunerated activities for seasonal workers is available staring from 2008 (First permits issued for remunerated activities by reason, 
length of validity and citizenship [migr_resocc]). However, figures up until 2016 are not necessarily in compliance with the Seasonal Workers Directive 
for which harmonised reporting requirements enter into effect as of 2017 data and there are many gaps related to seasonal work reporting. 
(SWD(2019) 1056 final). Moreover, the dataset does not provide information on the sector of employment. 
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8 % by Estonia. The majority of authorisations were issued for Moroccans (5 174), Ukrainians (952), 
Indians (862), Colombians (748) and Albanians (614).  
Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of authorisations for the purpose of seasonal work, by sectors and 
for the three countries with the largest number of authorisations issued. In the three countries, the 
majority of authorisations were issued for agriculture: 98, 64 and 73 % respectively for Spain, Italy, 
and Estonia. This is influenced by the choices made by the Member States when transposing the 
Seasonal Workers Directive, as they had to list those sectors of employment, which include activities 
that are dependent on seasonality21.  
                                                      
21 The Member States may modify that list, where appropriate in consultation with the social partners. The Member States shall inform the 
Commission of such modifications. Artilce 2 of the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU).  
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Box 2 Immigrants’ temporary work in agriculture – the case of Ukraine to Poland
 
The case of temporary migrations from Ukraine to Poland is emblematic of the central role played by the demand 
for labour in agriculture in representing a strong pull factor for migration. Given the temporary nature of these 
migrations, the LFS data and international immigration statistics are not fully capturing the relevance of these 
important flows. The LFS reports a total stock of 164.5 thousand migrants from Third Countries living in Poland in 
2017, while OECD data on immigration by citizenship indicate an annual flow of 106 thousand immigrants to Poland 
in 2016. 
 
EU statistics on residence permits indicate that the number of permits issued to Ukrainians in Poland has increased 
from less than 7.5 thousand in 2009 to almost 560 thousand in 2017 (Figure 2.10). This constitutes by far the largest 
bilateral corridor for legal migration to the EU. In 2017, the residence permits of Ukrainians to Poland were 
representing 23% of the total number of residence permits issued in the EU. Approximately 94% of these permits had 
duration below 12 months and 96% were related to work reasons. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Residence permits of Ukrainians to Poland (2008-2017). 
Note: excluding residence permits for humanitarian and other reasons. Source: own elaboration of EUROSTAT data 
(migr_resfirst). 
 
National Polish data from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy and recent analyses (Górny and 
Kaczmarczyk 2019) provide a clearer picture of the important role of agriculture in respect of this large number of 
residence permits. A great part of the increase in residence permits of Ukrainians to Poland can be linked to a 
simplified procedure for temporary migration introduced in 2006 to guarantee a constant supply of labour in 
agriculture, in particular in the fruit sector.  
This procedure represents a flexible entry system bypassing the more stringent and formal requirements foreseen 
for formal work permits (and the labour market test in particular). The procedure is based on the employer’s 
declaration of the intention to employ a foreigner that needs to be registered at the local labour office (an obligation 
to register an entry of departure of a foreigner has been introduced only in 2018). According to this procedure, the 
employed person can work up to period to six months without the need of having a work permit if the employment 
refers to selected persons and workers are originating from Armenia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia or 
Ukraine. Since the introduction of this procedure, the number of declarations of intention to employ foreigners 
have increased steadily reaching 1.8 million in 2017. Importantly this number does not translate directly into the 
real inflow of migrant workers as not all of the documents are being used. The estimated number of seasonal 
workers was as high as 1.1 million in 2017 (and slightly increased in 2018).  
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While the entry through this channel was expanding, the share of declarations used for agriculture has been 
decreasing from 35% in 2015 to 17% in 2017. By considering all forms of temporary migration, the absolute number 
of permits used in agriculture has decreased for the first time in recent years, from 220 thousand in 2016 to 200 
thousand in 2017. The diversion in the use of the simplified procedure from agriculture to other sectors and the 
overall decrease of temporary migrations destined to agriculture are questioning the ability to satisfy the future 
labour demand in specific regions and in the fruit sector through the import of temporary workers from Ukraine. 
There are three possible explanations for the declining ability of Polish agriculture to attract temporary foreign 
workers. The first is linked to the role of recruitment agencies, which has been expanding in relevance since the 
introduction of the simplified procedure. These agencies may act as gateways for the transfer of workers preferably 
towards other sectors and Member States rather than to Polish agriculture. The second reason may be linked to 
the restructuring of the legislation and the entry into force of the Seasonal Worker Directive, which has made more 
stringent the rules for entry in respect of the simplified procedure (for an overview, see Peers 2016, 384–88). The 
third reason may depend on the preferences of migrants themselves to work in other sectors rather than in 
agriculture. 
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 Residential patterns of migration and characteristics of 
agriculture at the local level in Spain and Italy 
The analyses in Chapter 1 and 2 do not allow capturing different territorial processes taking place 
in rural areas in regions, provinces, and Local Administrative Units within each country. It is 
particularly important to understand if at lower geographical scales the inflow of migrants is 
compensating for depopulation trends in specific rural areas, and if these trends depend on the 
structural characteristics of agricultural production. 
To tackle these issues we relied on spatially detailed data on the presence of migrants obtained 
from the Padrón Continuo22 in Spain and from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The 
downloaded data sets include annual figures on the evolution of the migrants’ population between 
2011 and 2017 in around 7 500 Local Administrative Units in Spain and 7 770 in Italy. 
For each local administrative unit we calculated the trends of population changes for natives and 
migrants by computing simple correlations between the annual population and years23.  
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of these correlations by degree of urbanisation of the Local 
Administrative Units and for the two population groups of migrants and natives. The panels on the 
right report the difference between the trends of migrants and natives. The horizontal lines are 
averages across all administrative units and the grey bars report 95% confidence intervals.  
A high value in difference between the two trends is indicative of cases where a demographic 
process of depopulation for natives is associated to an increase for migrants. Since, these 
differences are not taking into account the order of magnitude of the changes they should be 
interpreted as signals that demographic processes are moving in two opposite directions, rather 
than substitution between populations in absolute terms. The population of migrants may increase 
but giving its smaller size this increase may not compensate for the decrease of the much larger 
population of natives. 
                                                      
22 http://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736177012&menu=ultiDatos&idp=1254734710990 
23 A positive correlation is indicative of an expansion of population during the period considered while a negative value can be considered as evidence 
of trend for depopulation. 
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Figure 3.1 Population trends in Spain and Italy in the period 2014-2017 by degree of urbanisation and origin.  
Note: the lines represent averages across Local Administrative Units and grey bars 95% confidence intervals. Source: 
own elaboration of population data from Padrón Continuo and ISTAT. 
 
In the case of Spain, there is an average tendency for a decrease in population in all groups and 
areas. This is consistent with the decrease recorded at the aggregate level for the entire country24.  
Within this general trend, in the case of rural areas it is possible to observe a more pronounced 
decrease in the population of natives in respect of that of migrants. The tendency for substitution 
of migrants with natives is more pronounced in rural areas. The difference between the two trends 
in cities and rural areas is clearly emerging when looking at the right panel of Figure 3.1. 
The map in Figure 3.2 gives a geographical representation of these differences for each Local 
Administrative Unit in Spain. In the case of urban areas surrounding large cities like Madrid, 
Barcelona, or Valencia, and along the Mediterranean coast, it is possible to observe that the 
population of natives is increasing and the population of migrants is decreasing. The opposite 
tendency, with migrants coming in and natives leaving, is emerging in Local Administrative Units in 
the interior and less populated areas of Spain. 
                                                      
24 Between 2017 and 2011, the population of natives decreased by 3%, EU mobile citizens by 28%, and TC migrants increased by 0.4%. 
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Figure 3.2 Difference in the trend of population between natives and migrants between 2011 and 2017.  
Note: a positive value indicates that increasing trends for migrants is corresponding to a decreasing trend for natives. 
Source: own elaboration of population data from Padrón Continuo and ISTAT. 
 
In the case of Italy, the comparison of trends in Figure 3.1 shows an expansion of natives in urban 
areas and towns and a decrease in rural areas. In the case of migrants, the positive trend is more 
pronounced in cities in respect of towns and rural areas. When considering the difference between 
the two trends, the strong tendency of depopulation of natives in rural areas leads to the emergence 
a clearer effect of substitution for rural areas, despite the expansion of the migrants’ population in 
rural areas is not as large as in the case of cities. 
As a further step in the analysis, we merged the data on the resident population with the statistics 
of the last Agricultural Census at the local level. The main objective of this part of the analysis was 
to explore if high concentrations of migrants and changes in the migrants’ population can be 
explained by the characteristics of agriculture and in particular by the high share of temporary work 
and presence of labour intensive farming typologies. 
The left chart in Figure 3.3 displays the relationship between the average share of migrants and the 
share of the agricultural surface with horticulture in Spain. Each symbol is representing a local 
administrative unit excluding cities. The dotted box highlights cases of Local Administrative Units 
with particularly high shares of migrants and high presence of horticulture and the map gives a 
geographical representation of these cases. 
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Figure 3.3 Relation between the share of migrants (2011-2017) in Local Administrative Units in Spain and the share of 
agricultural surface with horticulture (2009).  
Note: the box in the chart and the map on the right highlight Local Administrative Units having particularly high values 
for these two variables. The circles in the map are proportional to the population of migrants residing in the Local 
Administrative Units. Source: own elaboration of population data from Padrón Continuo and the Agricultural Census 
2009 in Spain. Local Administrative Units exclude cities. 
 
Even though in some cases the high share of migrants is not directly linked to farming, there is an 
overall positive relationship between the two variables. This relation is confirmed by a regression 
model estimated using ordinary least squares where we control for overall population size and 
degree of urbanisation of the Local Administrative Units (see Box 3). The results of this regression 
model indicate that the share of agricultural surface with horticulture in the Local Administrative 
Units is positively associated with the presence of migrants. A positive relationship is detected for 
horticulture and greenhouses but not for tobacco cultivation (Column 1). Moreover, non-family 
work is positively associated with the presence of migrants. The regression includes a set of 
dummies to capture the effect attributable to the type of area. The negative coefficients at towns 
and rural areas dummies in Column 2 indicate that cities continue to be more attractive destination 
for migrants in Spain. The majority of coefficients reported in Column 2 are not significant which 
can be explained by the low inflow of migrants in Spain during the considered period.  
The importance of the relation between high shares of migrants and the presence of horticulture is 
clearly emerging in cases often described in the literature on migration in rural areas in Spain. These 
cases are shown in the box and plotted in the map on the right part of Figure 3.3. They include the 
municipalities of in the areas of the Poniente Almerienense (e.g. El Ejido), the strawberry fields of 
Huelva and the agricultural fields around Murcia and Castelló de la Plana. 
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Box 3 Regression models on the relation between the presence of migrants and characteristics of agriculture in Spain 
and Italy 
Spain 
 
Share of migrants in 2011 Δ migrants/population 
2011-2017 
 (1) (2) 
Non-family work (in full time equivalence) 0.054*** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
Horticulture (% of agricultural surface) 0.310*** 0.043 
 (0.096) (0.062) 
Greenhouses (% of agricultural surface) 0.237*** -0.012 
 (0.054) (0.030) 
Tobacco (% of agricultural surface) -0.243** 0.135* 
 (0.123) (0.069) 
Towns  0.046*** -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) 
Rural areas 0.052*** -0.039*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) 
Log (population 2011) 0.024*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.081*** 0.059*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) 
Observations 8 105 8 105 
R-squared 0.168 0.021 
 
 
Italy 
 Share of migrants in 2011 
Δ migrants/population 
2011-2017 
 (1) (2) 
Temporary employment (in full time equivalence) -0.087*** 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) 
Horticulture (% of agricultural surface) 0.151***   
 (0.024)   
Fruits (% of agricultural surface) 0.017*   
 (0.010)   
Greenhouses (% of agricultural surface) -0.094 0.151** 
 (0.078) (0.059) 
Towns 0.014*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Rural areas 0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Log (population 2011) 0.005*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.010* 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Observations 7 693 7 502 
R-squared 0.049 0.040 
Note: The dependent variable is the share of migrants in total population in 2011 (Column 1) and its change over period 2011-2017 
(Column 2). The sets of independent variables vary across countries due to the heterogeneity of information provided by the 
agriculture censuses the two countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.4 is analogous to Figure 3.3, this time related to Italy. In this case, the analysis considers 
the change in the share of migrants calculated through the correlation cited above and the share of 
temporary work total work agriculture.  
 
Figure 3.4 Relation between the change in the share of migrants in Local Administrative Units (excluding cities) in Italy 
and the share of temporary employment in total agricultural work (2010).  
Note: the box in the chart and the map on the right highlight Local Administrative Units having particularly high values 
for these two variables. The circles in the map are proportional to the population of migrants residing in the Local 
Administrative Units. Source: own elaboration of population data from ISTAT and the 6° Agricultural Census 2010 in 
Italy. 
 
Also in the case of Italy both the descriptive plot in the left panel of Figure 3.4 and the regression 
analysis in Box 3, confirm the presence of a positive association between the share of migrants and 
characteristics of agriculture. In particular, the positive relationship detected for horticulture and 
fruit production indicates that a larger share of surface in labour intensive agriculture is positively 
associated with the presence of migrants (Column 1). Moreover, a higher share of temporary work 
and presence of greenhouses is positively associated with the increase of the share of migrants in 
Italian communes. Also in the case of Italy, the negative coefficients for the towns and rural areas 
dummies in Column 2 indicate that overall, cities are more attractive for migrants. 
The areas in the box and plot show the most relevant cases where a high increase share of migrants 
corresponds to a particularly high share of temporary work in agriculture. These cases include well-
known areas described in the migration literature and often reported for problems of exploitation 
of irregular migrants (Corrado 2018). Some examples include Local Administrative Units in the green 
houses area of Ragusa, the tomatoes and fresh vegetables production area of Salerno and the Sele 
plain (Eboli, Battipaglia), and in the fruit production areas of San Ferdinando and the Rosarno-Gioia 
Tauro plain. 
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Overall, both the analysis for Spain and Italy show how geographical residential patterns at the local 
level can in many cases be explained by a particular type of agriculture requiring high inputs of 
temporary and seasonal work. These patterns are more difficult to capture quantitatively at higher 
administrative levels of provinces and regions where the small importance of agriculture and the 
overall tendency of migrants to concentrate in cities risks hiding territorial specificities.  
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 Salience and attitudes towards immigration and integration 
Beyond a description of the general features of the immigrant population living in rural areas, it is 
also interesting to know what is the perception of immigration and integration among people living 
in rural areas, and whether and to what extent this differs from people living in other, more 
urbanised locations.  
Past academic studies showed that people’s place of living matters in terms of attitudes towards 
immigration (Alba and Foner 2017). Media attention has recently focused on a rural-urban divide, 
purportedly shaping much of the current social, economic, and political challenges in Europe 
(Chassany, Wisniewska, and Ehrenberg-Shannon 2017; Rachman 2018) and beyond (Leatherby 
2016). More recent studies have portrayed Europe as a land of ‘Cosmopolitan’ large cities where 
immigration is viewed positively, and ‘Nationalist’ countryside, where the opposite is the case 
(Maxwell 2019). Such division, it is argued, is the result of compositional effect, meaning that 
individuals sort themselves into cities or rural areas for demographic and cultural reasons. As a 
corollary of these broader dynamics at play, attitudes towards immigration become more polarised 
between different degrees of urbanisation. Other studies25 have provided further evidence for this 
debate. Drawing on original, geo-coded surveys conducted in four Member States,  a project has 
shown that attitudes towards immigration differ only slightly depending on the rural or urban 
residence (Sub-national context and radical right support in Europe (ScoRE) 2019). This is mainly 
because, when controlling for other socio-economic factors such as age, education, or income, 
differences based on place of living tend to disappear.   
This section aims at measuring and describing such rural/urban divide in attitudes towards 
immigration by drawing on data from various Eurobarometer surveys. Briefly, what emerges from 
the descriptive analysis is the following: 
• In the EU28 aggregate, respondents’ place of residence is not associated with large differences 
in the perceived salience of immigration. 
• While at the EU28 level there are small differences in the perception of immigration as a 
problem or opportunity depending on the place of living at the respondents, this cloaks large 
differences between Member States. The same is true when looking at the perception of 
successful integration of immigrants.  
• When socioeconomic factors are considered, at the EU28 level, small differences in attitudes 
towards immigration between degrees of urbanisation persist. However, such differences 
connected to the place of living are substantially lower than differences connected with age, 
education, and occupation. 
  
                                                      
25 See the results from the ScoRE project, the acronym standing for ‘Sub-national context and radical right support in Europe’ (available at 
https://www.score.uni-mainz.de/). 
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Salience of immigration 
The Standard Eurobarometer is conducted twice per year and it contains questions related to the 
two most important issues for respondents26 at three levels: at a personal level, for the respondent’s 
country, and for the EU. These questions are generally, but not universally (Wlezien 2005), 
considered to gauge the salience of an issue, meaning how important a given topic is for 
respondents. Since 2010, immigration27 features as one of the topics that respondents can select at 
all three levels. We explore these questions by unpacking them by the respondents’ self-
positioning28 between ‘rural area or village', 'small or middle-sized town', and 'large town'.  
At the EU28 level, the salience of immigration seems to be highest when the question revolves 
around the EU, as compared to lower levels of importance at the country and particularly at the 
personal level (Figure 4.1). There seems to be little difference in the salience of immigration 
connected with the place of living29, as the lines representing those living in three different areas 
are very close to one another (if not completely overlapping, as in the case of the left-hand panel). 
The only two exceptions are when salience was recorded at country and EU level in 2015, where 
the differentials between large towns and small and medium towns reached approximately 5 pp. 
That said, in those cases rural areas stood in between these two, suggesting that the largest gaps 
are to be found within urbanised areas, rather than between urban and rural areas.  
 
Figure 4.1 Salience of immigration at the personal, country, and EU level, by place of living, in 2012, 2015, and 2018 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer30 Note: shares of weighted positive answers to the questions: ‘And personally, what 
are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment? Immigration’; ‘What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? Immigration’; ‘What do you think are the two most important 
issues facing the EU at the moment? Immigration’. Percentages are calculated for every year.  
                                                      
26 For the purpose of this chapter, we use weighted data by Eurobarometer. To achieve such weights, Eurobarometer compares the 
representativeness of the sample to official statistics, and focuses on gender, age, region and size of locality. While respondents may happen to be 
foreigners, the samples are not intended to be representative of the immigrant population. As Eurobarometer correctly and repeatedly points out, 
data extracted from the survey should be interpreted as estimations, whose accuracy is clarified out in the technical notes accompanying the surveys.  
27 There is no overarching definition of immigration provided by Eurobarometer. Because of this, we always report the full text of the questions read 
out to interviewees.  
28 In other words, and differently from previous chapters, the classification of degrees of urbanisation is not an official one, but one based on 
respondents self-assessment of their place of living. 
29 If we disaggregate these results by member states, the picture is not radically different. One of the few countries where we systematically observe 
large differences in the perceived salience of immigration by place of living is Austria. For other countries, differences in the perception of salience 
by place of living emerge only regarding specific questions. This is the case, for instance, of the question focusing on the most important issues at the 
EU level in France, where large gaps are recorded between the shares of those answering positively to immigration living in rural or urban areas 
(approximately 16 pp).  
30 Waves:  Eurobarometer 89.1 (03/2018)(ZA6963);  Eurobarometer 84.3 (11/2015)(ZA6643); Eurobarometer 78.1 (11/2012)(ZA5685). 
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Figure  compares salience of immigration at a regional level to other possible topics by place of living 
of the respondents – namely rural areas, small- or middle-sized towns, and large towns – again for 
the entire EU2831. While there are issues for which the place of living does matter in terms of 
regional salience of immigration – for instance, ‘crime’, or ‘unemployment’, or concerns regarding 
‘people and/or business going away’ – for others, including immigration, this does not seem to be 
relevant, as the three lines overlap to a considerable extent. In other words, residence in more or 
less urbanised areas does not seem to be relevant for respondents’ views on the salience of 
immigration at the regional level.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Salience of immigration in respect of other issues at the regional level, by place of living of the respondents, 
EU28 aggregate.  Source: Flash Eurobarometer32 
Notes: shares of weighted positive answers to the question ‘What do you think are the two most important issues facing 
your region at the moment?’. Percentages are calculated for every year on all issues, including ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’. 
These latter two are not shown in the graph. 
  
                                                      
31 Further analysis shows that, in many countries, differences tend to be small, except a few cases such as Belgium, Ireland, or Malta. Also, differences 
in regional salience widens over time in some cases (e.g. Ireland, Estonia, Slovenia), while closes down for others (e.g. Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovakia). 
This is not shown here for reasons of space, but figures are available upon request.  
32 Waves: 2018 Flash Eurobarometer 472; 2015 Flash Eurobarometer 427; 2012 Flash Eurobarometer 356. 
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Opinions of Europeans towards immigration and integration 
Besides knowing whether the perception of the salience of immigration changes depending on the 
place of living, it is important to understand whether the attitudes towards immigration change 
according to a purported rural-urban divide.  
At the EU28 level, immigration from outside the EU33 is perceived slightly less as a problem (and 
more as an opportunity) in both ‘large’ (39%) and ‘small and medium’ (38.2%) towns as compared 
to ‘rural’ areas (40.3%). Immigration is perceived more as an opportunity in large (21.9%) and small 
and medium (20.4%) towns as compared to rural areas (18.5%). Approximately a third of 
respondents regarded immigration in a more multidimensional manner, namely as both an 
opportunity and a problem. This classification was selected by 31.6% of respondents in rural areas, 
compared to 30.7% in large towns, and 32.2% in small and middle-sized towns.  
These aggregated figures aside, at the country level, there is a lot of variation (Figure 4.3). For 
reasons of space, we focus just on the classification of “immigration as a problem”. Differentials in 
the perception of immigration as a problem between rural and urban areas are particularly large 
(over 10 pp) in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Sweden, and Slovakia. There are 
exceptions though. Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, and Romania, are the most prominent cases amongst 
the seven countries where negative differentials occur, meaning that respondents in rural areas are 
less of the opinion that immigration is a problem as compared to those in large towns. If we compare 
rural areas to intermediate levels of urbanisation – i.e. ‘small and middle town’ –, we observe ten 
countries where differentials are negative. Therefore, while overall across EU28 we observe a small 
gap in attitudes towards immigration between rural and urbanised areas, this masks large 
differences between Member States. 
  
                                                      
33 In this Special Eurobarometer, interviewees were explicitly and repeatedly asked to concentrate on immigration from outside the European Union 
when answering to questions.  
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Figure 4.3 Percentage points difference between respondents perceiving immigration as a problem, an opportunity, 
equally a problem and an opportunity, or neither a problem nor an opportunity, by place of living and Member State 
Notes: percentage point’s differentials (subject to rounding error) are calculated by place of living for each Member 
State. Respondents were invited to answer to the following question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think immigration from 
outside the EU is more of a problem or more of an opportunity for (OUR COUNTRY) today?’ Source: Special 
Eurobarometer (2018)34. 
 
When it comes to the respondents’ assessment of integration35, there are two noteworthy trends 
to at EU28 level. First, the assessment tends to be more positive when respondents have to consider 
their local reality as compared to the national one. Second, in most EU countries, the share of 
respondents living in rural areas who think that immigrants from outside the EU have integrated 
successfully at the local level is lower than in both large, and small and medium towns. When the 
same question on effective integration is centred on the national level, while in the majority of 
countries those living in large towns have a more positive assessment of integration as compared 
to rural areas, the same is not true when the comparison is between rural areas and small and 
medium towns. 
                                                      
34 Eurobarometer 88.2 (10/2017)(ZA6927). 
35 Again, it is important to remember that interviewees were explicitly and repeatedly asked to concentrate on immigration from outside the European 
Union when answering to questions. 
 51 
 
Figure 4.4 Perception of successful integration at country level by place of living, at the EU28 (top) as well at Member 
State level (bottom).  
Source: Special Eurobarometer36. Notes: percentage point’s differentials (subject to rounding error) are calculated by 
place of living for each Member State. Respondents were invited to answer to the following question: ‘Generally 
speaking, how successful or not is the integration of most immigrants living … In the city or area where you live’ and ‘… 
In (OUR COUNTRY)’. We re-coded the answers to these two questions into three different bins, and the graph shows only 
the first answer, namely ‘Integrated’.  
 
To explore whether the admittedly small differences that we witness in attitudes towards 
immigration between places of living are related to other factors, we can observe the extent to 
which these differences persist after we keep constant other individual characteristics that are well 
known from the literature to shape attitudes on immigration. While there are many such factors, 
for brevity we focus here on education, age, and occupation.  
Figure 4.5 compares attitudes towards immigration37 between different degrees of urbanisation, 
within each level of education38, age, and for the occupations listed in the survey39. In addition, 
the graph also shows the results of the survey in 201440 and 201841. This enables us to observe 
                                                      
36 Eurobarometer 88.2 (10/2017)(ZA6927). 
37 For the sake of simplicity, here we collapsed the four categories of attitudes towards immigration into two categories, namely positive and negative 
views.  
38 A note of caution is here in order, as the variable in Eurobarometer measuring education may be difficult to interpret. Indeed, Eurobarometer asks 
the following question ‘How old were you when you stopped full-time education?’. This is not the same as asking for highest educational achievement, 
or years of completed education. The reader should be aware that, therefore, the different age brackets are not the same as, for instance, first, 
second, and tertiary educated as often seen in Eurostat statistics.  
39 In other words, the graph shows variation in attitudes towards different forms of immigration between rural areas, while holding constant certain 
demographics, such as education, age, and occupation. For instance, the first row should be read as follows: among those who stopped full time 
education when they were 15 years old, for what concerns immigration from within the EU, there were no differences between degrees of 
urbanisation in 2014, and between 1 and 3 percentage points in 2018; for what concerns immigration from outside the EU, differences between 
degrees of urbanisation ranged between 0 and 1 percentage points in 2014, and 0 to 2 percentage points in 2018.  
40 The survey was conducted in November 2014. 
41 The survey was conducted in March 2018. 
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whether and to what extent opinions on immigration from both within the Union and from 
outside the Union have shifted over this period.  
 
Figure 4.5 Attitudes towards immigration from within and outside the ERU, by place of living and education, 2015 and 
2018. Source: Standard Eurobarometer42. 
Note: Respondents were asked their opinions on: ’ Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a 
positive or negative feeling for you’.  ‘1. Immigration of people from other Member States’; ‘2. Immigration of people 
from outside the EU’. The possible answers were: ‘Very positive’, ‘Fairly positive’, ‘Fairly negative’, ‘Very negative’, ‘DK’. 
Those who answered ‘Don’t know’ were excluded from the calculations. We collapsed the other answers into two groups, 
and the table above shows only the positive answers, namely those who answered ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly 
positive’(subject to rounding error). 
 
As an overall note, the graph makes it explicit that, at the EU28 level, attitudes towards immigration 
from within the Union are more positive than those towards immigration from outside the Union. 
Turning to education, what emerges is that, first, rural/urban differences in attitudes towards 
immigration, albeit small, persist when controlling for education. However, moving to perceptions 
regarding immigrants from outside the EU, it is interesting to notice that, among those who stopped 
full-time education under 15 years old, those living in rural areas have more positive views 
compared to those living in more urbanised areas. Second, as often observed in the literature 
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), attitudes tend to become more positive as education increases. 
These differentials are very large, ranging between 11 and 23 pp, depending on the year, the place 
of living, and what kind of immigration is considered. However, what we also notice is that the gap 
between those who stopped education after 20 years old and those that stopped at 15 is wider in 
large cities as compared to rural areas. This is true when considering both types of immigration, 
meaning from within and outside the Union. Third, and as a corollary of the first two points, 
considering attitudes towards immigration from within the Union, gaps between the degrees of 
urbanisation tend to grow with increasing levels of education, and those living in more urbanised 
areas have more positive views of immigration. Fourth, there has been a significant shift towards 
                                                      
42 Waves:  Eurobarometer 89.1 (03/2018)(ZA6963);  Eurobarometer 82.3 (11/2014)(ZA5932). 
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more positive views on immigration from within the Union between 2014 and 2018, and particularly 
for residents in large cities. When it comes to attitudes towards immigration from outside the Union, 
this has only marginally become more positive in the same period. In parallel, all gaps between 
places of living by education have increased between 2014 and 2018.  
As well documented in the academic literature, age is inversely proportional to attitudes towards 
immigration. Figure 4.5 shows that this holds true disregarding the place of living. The gaps are very 
large, between approximately 18 and 11 pp between the youngest and oldest cohorts, depending 
on the year and what kind of immigration is considered. Furthermore, the gap between places of 
living seems to be growing between 2014 and 2018, particularly when it comes to attitudes towards 
immigration from within the Union.  
Finally, differences in attitudes towards immigration from both within and outside the Union remain 
even after holding constant occupation. The most negative views are recorded among unemployed 
and retired people, whereas the most positive among students and managers. 
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 Integration of migrants in European rural areas: developing a 
policy response  
The need for data to design policy responses 
While Eurostat and other data providers have long been collecting and releasing statistics on 
international immigration at country level, subnational disaggregation covering all EU28 Member 
States is seldom available. The lack of data on the presence of migrants in urban, intermediate or 
rural areas can be challenging for policymakers, public authorities and stakeholders who have to 
structure interventions for the integration of third-country nationals, as difficulties faced by large 
cities are different from those of remote rural areas.   
Nevertheless, in the frame of the Urban Agenda Partnership on the inclusion of migrants and 
refugees, some recommendations to improve evidence-based integration policies at the local level 
were published and Eurostat started to publish some integration indicators at infra-national level 
(both by the degree of urbanisation and by NUTS2 regions)43.  
The need to cater for the integration of migrants in rural areas has been recognised both by the 
European Parliament and in the European Commission’s work programme. Through the European 
Network for Rural Development (ENRD), and the dialogue between the Directorate General of 
Agriculture and Rural Development and the Managing Authorities of the Rural Development 
Programmes, the European Commission is aware of the relevance of migration in rural areas, 
including refugees, even if data is not always included in official statistics. However, to better target 
the policy response, more constant and updated data would be necessary. For instance, migrants 
who are passing through rural areas as part of their migratory path have different needs than those 
migrants who settle there as refugees or than those who arrive in rural areas attracted by job 
opportunities in agriculture.  
Indeed, the creation of data sorted by territorial typologies is the first step to take in order to plan 
interventions according to the local characteristics.  
Challenges and opportunities of migration in rural areas 
Migration in Europe is mostly an urban phenomenon (see Chapter 1). That said, in relative terms, 
immigration may still amount to a significant share of the population in some small villages44. The 
presence of migrants in rural areas presents specific challenges and opportunities for both third-
country nationals and hosting communities.  
Third-country nationals located in rural areas might be in a more vulnerable situation because of 
remoteness, isolation and limited access to targeted services, such as psychological and social 
support, language learning, information availability, but also to basic services like health, education, 
and transport, because of the structural lack of those facilities in some EU rural areas. At the same 
time, if rural communities are not properly prepared to receive migrants, and if the local authorities 
have limited capacity to respond to inflows of migrants, negative attitudes may arise at the local 
level (see Chapter 4), especially in those places characterized by a stagnant economy where 
migrants’ workforce may be perceived as in competition with EU citizens.     
                                                      
43 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics 
44 For instance, the Swedish Rural Network reported that some villages which have received refugees have triplicated their population, op. cit., 
consulted on 22/05/2019.  
 55 
The presence of migrants in rural areas can have positive aspects. Indeed, the ageing of the 
population and depopulation dynamics, that result, in some cases, in the lack of labour force to run 
basic services (such as care services for elderly people) and economic activities, including  farming 
and forestry, are demographic phenomena that affect EU rural areas and an appropriate level of 
legal immigration may contribute to deal with those challenges. In fact, migrant workers already 
play a role in the European agricultural sector, especially in Southern countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal), as confirmed also by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO)45,  but also in other countries such as Poland, as indicated in this report. Third-country 
nationals do not necessarily compete with natives in the labour market of the agricultural sector, 
but they may compete with low skilled EU mobile citizens, as they are more likely to be employed 
in non-specialised positions (see Chapter 2). However, particular attention should be paid by 
policymakers to the respect of labour rights in the sector, as “work in agriculture is often precarious, 
and cases of infringements regarding labour rights, exploitation and forced labour have been 
reported across the EU”46. 
Legal framework and possibilities for a policy response to support the integration of migrants 
in rural areas 
The EU migration policy has its legal basis in Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). The Article states that “The Union shall develop a common immigration 
policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment 
of third-country nationals residing legally in the Member States, and the prevention of, and 
enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings”. Additionally, 
TFEU Article 78 indicates that the Union shall also develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection. The implementation of these policies shall be governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States (Article 80). However, MSs have been debating on external borders 
and internal freedom of movement since the creation of the Schengen area, as they had to face new 
challenges guaranteeing the free circulation of EU citizens. In addition, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) played a role in this process through its jurisprudence47.  
The nature of the subject and the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities between 
MSs has required coordination among MSs. They have progressively established new cooperation 
mechanisms on immigration, asylum and visa matters48, maintaining their right to determine 
volumes of admission of migrants coming from third-countries to their territory in order to seek 
work (Article 78(5) TFEU).  
At the EU level, various directives dealing with EU mobile citizens and third-country nationals49 were 
adopted since the 1990s50. More recently, the Commission adopted the European Agenda on 
                                                      
45 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, op. cit., 2018, p. 98. 
46 European Commission – Agriculture and Rural Development, Modernising & simplifying the CAP - Socio-Economic challenges facing agriculture and 
rural areas, 2010, p.10.  
47 For instance, Case C-369/90 Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria. 
48 For a comprehensive historical overview, see Fact Sheets On The European Union, Migration and Asylum: a challenge for Europe, 18/06/2018, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI(2017)600414_EN.pdf, consulted on 22/05/2019.  
49 If from a legal perspective, the EU mobile citizens and third-country nationals face different frameworks and consequently different challenges that 
policy makers have to take into account, they may encounter similar situations in the labour market (see Chapter 2).   
50 For instance, Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) amended by Directive 2018/957/EU, Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC), Long-Term 
Residents Directive (2003/109/EC), Temporary Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC), EU Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC), Employers Sanctions 
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Migration51 (2015), which has established four pillars to manage migration better: reducing the 
incentives for irregular migration; border management – saving lives and securing external borders; 
Europe's duty to protect: a strong common asylum policy; a new policy on legal migration.52   
In the field of integration of third-country nationals, the competence is shared between the EU and 
MSs, but these last ones remain primarily responsible for integration policies. TFEU Article 79(4) 
provides for the possibility for the EU to "establish measures to provide incentives and support for 
the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals 
residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States".  
The EU has been supporting MSs in their integration policies for several years already. In 2014, the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council reaffirmed the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration Policy53 adopted in 2004, which set out a common approach to immigrant integration 
across the EU. In 2011, the European Commission set out a European Agenda for the integration of 
third-country nationals, calling for a strengthened and coherent approach to integration, across 
different policy areas and government levels. The Commission has also developed, in dialogue with 
the MSs, common indicators to monitor results of integration policies and the EU has supported 
integration actions through dedicated funding and more broadly through instruments addressing 
social and economic cohesion across the Member States.54 Moreover, the European Commission 
has taken steps to support MSs in the integration of third-country nationals through the adoption, 
in 2016, of The Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals55, which includes actions in 
the following policy areas:  
• Pre-departure and pre-arrival measures, including actions to prepare migrants and the local 
communities for the integration process; 
• Education, including actions to promote language training, the participation of migrant children 
to Early Childhood Education and Care, teacher training and civic education; 
• Employment and vocational training, including actions to promote early integration into the 
labour market and migrants entrepreneurship; 
• Access to basic services such as housing, healthcare and social inclusion, including actions to 
support exchanges with the receiving society, migrants' participation to cultural life and fighting 
discrimination.56 
                                                      
Directive (2009/52/EC), EU Anti-trafficking Directive 2011/36/EU, Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU), Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU), 
Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU), Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801). 
51 COM (2015) 240 final, A European Agenda for Migration, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf, 
consulted on 22/05/2019.  
52 For further information, COM(2019) 126 final - Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190306_com-2019-126-
report_en.pdf , consulted on 22/05/2019. 
53 Council of the European Union, 2618th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs,    
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf, consulted on 29/05/2019.  
54 For more information, the European Web Site on Integration provides a database of good practices in the field of integration, 
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/home, consulted on 29/05/2019.  
55 COM(2016) 377 final Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_action_plan_integration_third-
country_nationals_en.pdf, consulted on 22/05/2019.  
56 The Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-
migration/integration/action-plan-integration-third-country-nationals_en, consulted on 22/05/2019.  
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MSs that deal with the integration of third-country nationals can use different EU funds to focus 
their intervention in rural areas, for instance: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Fund for 
European Aid to the Most Deprived  (FEAD), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD).  
Indeed, the Rural Development policy, also known as the second pillar of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, funded by the EAFRD, can contribute to the integration of third-country nationals especially 
under its Priority 6 - Promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development in 
rural areas. Since 2016, the European Commission has requested the Managing Authorities of Rural 
Development Programmes to report on the operations that have a potential contribution to the 
integration of third-country nationals in rural areas (Article 14 (4) of Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 808/2014). There is also an effort by the European Commission through its 
Directorates-General responsible for the above-mentioned funds to support MSs on the 
coordinated use of those funds for the integration of migrants.57 In January 2019, the Directorate-
General Agriculture and Rural Development has also established an internal Social Task Force on 
social inclusion in agriculture and rural areas to see how attention to social issues in agriculture and 
rural areas could be improved.   
The existing legislation on fair working conditions and on healthy, safe and well-adapted work 
environments may provide instruments to intervene at the national level through appropriate work 
inspections. At the European level, along with the directives previously mentioned (in particular the 
Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU)), the creation of the European Labour Authority58 might 
also be a tool to effectively implement and respect labour rights (in particular of EU mobile citizens). 
However, it is too early to draw conclusions on this initiative.  
Rural areas can be territories that offer innovative and often bottom-up solutions for successful 
integration in a context of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Several initiatives, often 
implemented through measure 19 – Support for LEADER local development (CLLD) - of the Rural 
Development Programmes59 , were reported in various MSs (among others Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom)60. The successful, well thought out 
integration of migrants in rural areas, with public support, can have positive effects on the 
revitalisation of rural areas: for example, further investments in services and better rural-urban 
connections through the improvement of infrastructures and public transport; or development of 
environmentally or territorially sustainable projects.  
In conclusion, migration to rural areas can foster rural development, when this is the result of a 
choice of the local population and of the migrants themselves. It might have also positive effects on 
overcrowded urban areas, which are experiencing problems such as lack of housing, congestion, 
                                                      
57 Among others initiatives, see European Commission, Synergies between the Asylum Migration  and Integration Fund (AMIF)  and other EU 
funding instruments  in relation to reception and integration of  asylum seekers and other migrants, 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/20151109-synergies-amif_en.pdf, consulted on 05/06/2019; European Commission, 
Toolkit on the use of EU funds for the integration of people with a migrant background, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/social-inclusion/integration-of-migrants/toolkit-integration-of-migrants.pdf, consulted 
on 05/06/2019;    
58 European Parliament, European Labour Authority, Briefing - Legislation in Progress, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625101/EPRS_BRI(2018)625101_EN.pdf, consulted on 22/05/2019.  
59 Regulation (EU) No 1350/2013. 
60 European Network for Rural Development, The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development - Migrant and Refugee integration, Projects 
Brochure, https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/sites/enrd/files/publi-eafrd-brochure-03-en_2016.pdf, consulted on 22/05/2019. 
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and pollution. The coordination of the European, national, regional, and local level is fundamental 
to implement properly the tools available to support both public authorities and the population, to 
receive and integrate third-country nationals and to enable them to play an active part in local 
communities.   
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